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The metaphysical system of Thomas Aquinas is a power­
ful instrument, the correct application of which provides the 
solutions to many ancient and modern problems in philoso­
phy. The difficulty is, however, that the system is just as 
subtle as it is powerful: a misapplication of its principles in 
solving one of these problems will inevitably lead to further 
complications. In this paper I examine such a case. 
In an interesting paper, Henry Veatch explores the syn­
thetic a priori as it relates to the philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas. In it he correctly argues that there is no easy 
reconciliation of the positions, yet Aquinas' principia per se 
nota fulfils Kant's demand for necessary truths about the 
world. The question 'how are synthetic a priori judgements 
possible?' becomes, for Thomists, the question 'how do the 
principia per se nota of the various sciences yield genuine 
information about the world?'. In answering the latter ques­
tion, I argue that Veatch fails to distinguish the methods 
proper to the different sciences. As a result of this failure, he 
turns Thomistic metaphysics into an empirical science, one 
which lacks the necessity and universality of true Thomistic 
metaphysics. 
I: The Synthetic A Priori and Thomistic Epistemology 
Kant famously divides judgements into analytic and 
synthetic. An analytic proposition is one in which the predi­
cate is contained in the concept of the subject. A synthetic 
proposition is one in which the predicate is added to the 
concept of the subject. Thus analytic truths are true 'by 
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definition', and are known to be true once their terms are 
understood. Synthetic propositions, however, need some­
thing other than the terms involved for verification. In the 
case of synthetic a posteriori judgements, sense experience 
verifies whether they are true or false. In the case of synthetic 
a priori judgements, however, Kant believed some 'third' 
thing must be added to the concepts to 'guarantee' its truth. 
The first principles (the principia per se nota), or founda­
tions, of Thomistic science are self-evident propositions. 
These principles are known in themselves (thus are per se 
nota) and are better known than the conclusions which follow 
from them. Aquinas states that 1/ a proposition is self-evident 
because the predicate is included in the essence of the sub­
ject" (Summa I,q.2,a.l). For example, 'Man is an animal' is 
self-evident because animalis included in the essence of man. 
The truth of the proposition is known when one understands 
that animal is included in the essence of man. 
Clearly, in the Kantian classification, the principia per se 
nota are analytic. This would not be a problem for Thornists, 
except for the implications of such a classification. As Veatch 
states, II [a]naly tic propositions, it turns out, since they in­
volve no more than a mere analysis of what is already 
contained in our concepts, are held to be of no real factual 
import at all" (Veatch 243). Since, it is argued, analytic 
propositions are true merely because we happen to use 
language in a certain way they are informative, not of the 
world or facts, but only of the conventions of our language. 
If a proposition claims to be about the world, it cam10t be 
analytic. If it cannot be analytic itmust be synthetic, and thus 
appeal to something other than the nature of the proposition 
itself to determine its truth. Thomists claim, however, that 
the per se nota propositions It are necessary and yet a t the same 
time give information about reality" (Copleston 28). On the 
Kantian classification, however, this is not possible. If a 
proposition is about the world or informative then it must be 
synthetic and appeal to something other than its intrinsic 
nature to guarantee its truth. 
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If the Kantian scheme is correct, then for Thomists /I the 
assertions of metaphysics would be purely verbat nothing 
more" (Veatch 256). A Thomist, therefore, simply cannot 
accept Kant's distinction1• The Thomist maintains, contra 
Kant, that it is possible for a proposition to be necessarily true 
in virtue of its intrinsic nature and still be genuinely informa­
tive (Le. not be purely verbal). It is not enough, however, 
merely to say Kant is wrong, for Kant showed how he 
thought synthetic a priori propositions, on his account, were 
possible. One must show how such 'analytic informative' 
propositions are possible. If not, there is no reason to reject 
Kant, and Thomistic science would be groundless. Thus for 
Thomists, the question 'how are synthetic a priori judge­
ments possible?' amounts to 'how are the principia per se nota 
informative about the world?'. 
This is exactly what Veatch attempts to answer. He tries 
to show that the per se nota propositions can be true by the 
meanings of the terms involved (analytic in Kant's terms), 
give information about the world (synthetic in Kant's terms) 
and necessarily true (a priori). He does so by arguing "one 
can readily see that there is no reason at all why such truths 
should not be informative or should not be truths about the 
world" (Veatch 254). At the end of his response, however, he 
runs into serious problems for the principles of metaphysics, 
claiming "is there not a sense in which even these principles 
fall short of strict universality and necessity?" (Veatch 260). 
In the following, I argue that Veatch's response is mis­
taken beca use he fails to distinguish the different methods of 
the sciences. He doesn't recognize that principles can be 
about the world in different ways. By answering'how canper 
se nota propositions be about the world?', I show that the 
correct response avoids the problems Veatch runs into. 
II: The Division of Thomistic Speculative Sciences 
Aquinas stressed the necessity of distinguishing the dif­
ferent methods of the different sciences: 1/ For this reason they 
are in error who try to proceed in the same way in these three 
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parts of speculative science" (Aquinas Q.6,a.2). The three 
speculative sciences are natural science, mathematics and 
metaphysics. Since Veatch focuses on natural science and 
metaphysics they will be my primary focus. The sciences 
differ in object and method and so, naturally, they will differ 
in the nature of their judgments. In order to see how and why 
they differ, I must examine their objects and methods. 
As Aquinas states, lithe speculative sciences are differen­
tiated according to their degree of separation from matter 
and motion" (Aquinas Q.5,a.l). The objects of natural science 
cannot exist nor be considered without matter. The natural 
scientist studies "mutable and material things existing out­
side the soul throughnatures... thatare immobile and consid­
eredwithoutparticular matter" (Aquinas Q.5,a.3). The meta­
physician studies things which mayor may not exist without 
matter and can be considered without matter. 
Aquinas' account of the nature and method of the sci­
ences requires two distinct operations of the intellect. The 
first is the "understanding of indivisible by which it knows 
what a thing is" (Aquinas Q.5,a.3). This operation considers 
a thing's nature without taking the existence ornon-existence 
of the object into account. It can also abstract truthfully what 
is not separate in reality, since it does not concern itself with 
actual existence. 
The second operation of the intellect "joins and divides, 
by forming affirmative and negative statements" (Aquinas 
Q.5,a.3). This operation deals exclusively with a thing's 
existence. Since truth is an adequation ofmind and thing, this 
operation must compose and divide according to what is 
composed and divided in reality. Upon grasping what 
'grass' and'green' are, the mind composes the two in 'Grass 
is green'. Contrastingly, the mind divides man and stone, in 
'Man is not a stone'. This operation deals with a thing's 
existence, judging that it exists in one way or does not exist in 
another. As Aquinas states, lithe operation by which it 
composes and divides, it distinguishes one thing from an­
other by understanding that the one does not exist in the 
other" (Aquinas Q.5,a.3). 
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Both of these operations are important for the present 
issue. The per se nota propositions are judgements made by 
the second operation of the intellect. As such, they are 
judgements about the being or existence of the objects in 
question. The'analytic nature' of the propositions rests on 
the first operation of the intellect. 'Man is an animal' is a 
judgement aboutthe way men exist. The judgement is based 
on the mind grasping the nature of manand animal in the first 
operation and forming the judgement in the second. This is 
a preliminary response to the problem of how judgements 
can be necessarily true by virtue of their terms alone, and also 
be informative (Le. not merely verbal). It is preliminary, 
however, because the different sciences' grasp' and 'judge' in 
different ways, a fact Veatch overlooks. To understand how 
each science proceeds, we must understand the different 
methods of the sciences. 
Natural science and metaphysics distinguish their ob­
jects in different ways. Natural science distinguishes its 
objects by simple apprehension or "through the same opera­
tion which is the abstraction of a universal from a particular" 
(Aquinas Q.5,a.3). Itgrasps the essence or nature of an object, 
not by abstracting the form from matter (as in mathematics) 
butby abstracting the universal from the partkular individu­
als. This is abstractio totius. For example, the mind abstracts 
, man' from Plato and Socrates,leaving aside their designated 
matter and accidents. 
Metaphysics, however, does not distinguish its objects by 
simple apprehension, but "through the operation of the 
intellect joining and dividing which is properly called sepa­
ration; and this belongs to divine science or metaphysics" 
(Aquinas Q.5,a.3). Since metaphysics is concerned with 
being as being, negative judgements are its primary method 
for distinguishing. The judgements of the second operation 
ofthe intellect deal primarily with the act of exis ting ofthings. 
In contrast, the act of simple apprehension deals with a 
thing's essence. Metaphysics, therefore, will have to be an 
inherently and uniquely existential science. The objects of 
metaphysics are those things which may, but need not, exist 
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in matter. By considering such objects in negative judge­
ments, the metaphysician at once denies their dependencyon 
matter and affirms their act of being. In short, he considers 
being as being. 
Metaphysics and natural science also proceed by differ­
ent methods. Natural science proceeds by an especially 
rational method. 'This procedure is 'rational' in two ways. 
First it remains closest to sensation. Since its objects can 
neither be considered nor exist without matter, it is inevitably 
linked to the material world given in sensation. Secondly, it 
proceeds discursively from one thing to another. In it /Idem­
onstration takes place through extrinsic causes, [and] some­
thing is proved of one thing through another thing entirely 
external to it", and therefore" the method of reas on is particu­
larly observed innatural science, and on this account natural 
science among all others is most ill conformity with the 
human intellect" (Aquinas Q.6,a.l). 
Metaphysics, however, proceeds ina very different man­
nero The meta physician proceeds intellectually. As Aquinas 
states, " divine science proceeds intellectually not as though 
it makes no use of reason ... but because its reasoning most 
closely approaches intellectual considerations and its conclu­
sions are closestto its principles" (Aquinas Q.6,a.1.,r.1). Since 
the objects of metaphysics are intellectual (i.e. surpass the 
imagination and sensation), the method must also be intellec­
tuaL It proceeds by apprehending truth simply, more syn­
thetic than the analytic, discursive rational method. In this 
sense it more closely resembles the intellect of separate 
substances, and thus it is a struggle for man, who is called a 
rational animal precisely because the rational method Is proper 
to him. 
Natural science and metaphysics differ in the way in 
which they distinguish their objects, the method by which 
they proceed, and they also differ in their end or terminus. 2­
As Aquinas states 1/ all our knowledge begins in the senses ... 
but knowledge does not always termillate in the same way" 
(Aquinas Q.6,a.2). Natural science deals with objects which 
cannot be conceived or exist without matter, and the rational 
method itemploys is tied closely to sense data. The tenninus, 
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therefore, "of knowledge in natural science must be in the 
senses, with the result that we judge of natural beings as the 
senses manifest them" (Aquinas Q.6,a.2). Our judgements in 
natural science must correspond to, and must be modified 
with new sense data, our sense experience. 
The objects and method of metaphysics, however, are 
intellectual. As Aquinas states: "There are other beings 
however, that transcend both that which falls under the 
senses and that which falls under the imagination", and 
"when we know things of this kind through judgement, our 
knowledge must terminate neither in the imagination nor in 
the senses" (Aquinas Q.6,a.2). The judgements of metaphys­
ics terminate in the intellect and are not subject to empirical 
verification like the judgements of natural science. 
In this section I have examined the different methods, 
ways of distinguishing objects, and termini. These differ­
ences have important consequences for the way in which the 
principles of the different sciences are'about the world'. In 
the next section, I will explore some of these consequences, 
and in the process solve the problems encountered byVeatch. 
III: The Principia Per Se Nota as 'Synthetic' 
As Veatch argued, and I agreed with above, the question 
for Thomists of the possibility of synthetic a priori proposi­
tions is really the question of how the principia per se nota can 
be about the world or genuinely informative. Veatch an­
swers this problem quite convincingly. His solution, how­
ever, is overly simplistic. It is because of this simplicity he 
encounters problems in dealing with the principles of meta­
physics. 
The argument against the informative nature of'analytic' 
propositions was that, since their truth was determined by 
the definitions of the terms involved, they were merely truths 
abou t the way in which we use language. Veatch argues that 
self-evident propositions are informative because they are 
talking about the world. For example, 'Man is an animal' is 
not a judgement about the way we happen to use the word 
'man', Rather it is a judgement about those objects whichwe 
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happen to call 'men', specifically they are the sorts of things 
we call 'animals'. The confusion, Veatch argues, rests on a 
confusion between what is meant and the meaning. Per se 
nota propositions are judgements about things. 
Secondly, the objective nature of per se nota propositions 
serve to refute the claim that analytic propositions are mere 
verbalisms. The proposition 'Man is an animal' is self­
evident (analytic), "[b Jut clearly, the self-evidence of this 
principle does not have to turn on our understanding the 
meaning of man or animal" (Veatch 258). 'Man is an animal' 
is self-evident because of the intrinsic nature of the proposi­
tion, independently of our understandingit, or calling a man 
a man, or an animal an animal. The proposition is only self­
evident because the nature ofman includes animal. Thus the 
proposition must be informative. As Veatch concludes: 
if 'dependence on meanings and concepts' is under­
stood as dependence on the things so meant and the 
objects so conceived, then the truth of a self-evident 
proposition will of course depend on the facts in the 
case and on the way the world is" (Veatch 259). 
Concluding from these two arguments, Veatch asks: 
Who says then, that the self-evident truths of meta­
physics cannot be about the world and cannot even 
claim to be factual statements at all? No; the self­
evidence of such principles means just that they are 
evident through the facts themselves that these prin­
ciples are about and not through any other facts or 
anything else whatever. (Veatch 260) 
After thus concluding, Veatch runs into more problelTIs. If 
the principles of metaphysics are informative in this way, are 
about the facts, then how can they maintain their necessity 
and universality? He develops this problem in two ways. 
First, it seems as though "these principles [of metaphys­
ics] are able to have factual import and to apply to the real 
world only if there is such a world or created universe for 
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them to apply to" 01ea tch 261). Furthermore, the existence of 
the world is contingent upon the will of God. These prin­
ciples must positthatthere are such objects as they are talking 
about, and such a positing is notnecessary nor universaL The 
example he uses is 'If anything is an accident, then itcan only 
be the accident of a substance'. Ifsuch a proposition can have 
factual import only if there is a world to apply to then it must 
also add 'There are such accidents in the world'. The second 
proposition, Veatch argues, is neither necessary nor univer­
saL 
The second problem Veatch faces is that if the principles 
of metaphysics require i facts' to apply to, and the facts of our 
world are contingent, II then will it not likewise be contingent 
and open to question whether these particular self-evident 
propositions or some others are the ones that apply to the 
facts of our world?" (Veatch 261). Veatch argues that if this 
world is contingent then it may be ordered according to 
different principles then those of Thomistic metaphysics. If 
so then how is it possible to determine which principles are 
correct? One can conceive of other possible worlds, and one 
can conceive that our world is ordered differently than we 
had thought. Given the conceivable alternatives, "how are 
we to know which order is the actual one?" for: 
it would seem that it could not be by experience that 
we know that the order of our world is one of sub­
stance-accident, of cause-effect, and so on, since expe­
rience can never guarantee the requisite universality 
and necessity of such principles. (Veatch 262) 
And this problem returns once again to the beginning, and to 
how propositions about the world can be necessarily true, or 
'How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?'. 
Veatch faces these problems because he did not answer 
the original question correctly. More directly, he failed to 
distinguish the methods of the different sciences. Drawing 
from what I said above, I shall now show where Veatch falls 
into error, and that the true Thomistic position avoids such 
problems in its solution. 
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Veatch has no problems with the way in which the 
principles of natural science are informative. In fact, his 
example, 'Man is an animal' is a principle of natural science. 
Innatural science, the intellect abstracts the essence or nature 
of its object, in this case man. The judgement based on this 
nature, 'Man is an animal' is self-evident to us because we 
have grasped the nature of man. This judgement is based on 
the nature, but strictly speaking it is about the world because 
the terminus of the science is sensation. We know they are 
true because they are self-evident, but they are only true 
because the judgements conform to what sensation delivers. 
It is clear that natural science and its principles will be 
informative or 'about the world' because its method and 
terminus never strays from sensation. 
Here Veatch is correct in claiming the principia per se no l'a 
are informative, even though his explanation is simplistic. 
All principia per se nota, however, are not alike. What Veatch 
does is force metaphysics to conform to the methods of 
natural science. In short, he makes metaphysics empirical by 
demanding its principles be 'about tlle world' in the same 
way the as the principles of natural science. Metaphysics has 
a different method and terminus than natural science and 
therefore its principles apply to, the world in a different 
manner; if one does not recognize this, he will be faced with 
the same problems as the 'empirical metaphysics' of Veatch. 
The question now is, how do the principles of metaphys­
ics apply to the world? The judgements and principles of 
metaphysics are about the world in a rather peculiar way. To 
begin with metaphysics distinguishes its objects by separa­
tion. As we have seen this makes the subject inherently 
existential. In the beginning, therefore, metaphysics has a 
great deal of factual import. The procedure or method of 
metaphysics, however, removes it from the realm of sensa­
tion, and presumably form Veatch's factual world. This 
culminates in the terminus of metaphysics, which is the 
intellect. It seems as though its judgements are too transcen­
dent to be about the world. On this very subject,however, the 
eminent Thomist Jacques Maritain remarks: 
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The judgement wherein knowledge is perfected opens 
upon the pure intelligible. For it is not because (as in 
the case of the philosophy of nature) it depends 
essentially on sensible experience, but rather because 
of its transcendence, that metaphysics descends (as 
mathematics does not) to the world of sensible exist­
ence. (Maritain 56) 
It is because of the transcendence of metaphysical objects and 
judgements that they apply to the sensible world. 
The subject matter of metaphysics is being as being. 
Anything which actually or possibly exists does so because it 
possesses being. Since the judgements of metaphysics apply 
to ens inquantum ens, they apply to all beings. Since the 
judgements are about all being, it applies to the specific type 
of being which is called sensible being. Furthermore it 
applies to God as that which is saidofthe effect applies to the 
cause. This is how the judgements of metaphysics apply to 
our world. 
From this we can see the problems Veatch encountered 
need nothave arisen. Since the judgements apply to all being 
(ens commune), they necessarily apply to sensible being, even 
though they are not about sensible being. We need not posit 
that 'there are such things as accidents in the world' for 'If 
anything is an accident, then it can only be the accident of a 
substance' to be universally and necessarily true. For it is a 
claim about being in itself, the perfect instance of which is 
God, and God is ultimately necessary. Furthermore the claim 
is universal insofar as it applies to all possible being and 
beings. Veatch, therefore, is mistaken when he questions 
how we know the principles apply to other possible worlds 
or even if our world is so ordered. The judgements of 
metaphysics apply to all possible being and beings. 
As to the question 'how are synthetic a priori judgements 
possible?' we have seen that for Thomists this amounts to 
'how do the principia per Be nota of the various sciences yield 
genuine information about the world?'. I have argued that 
Veatch answered this question incorrectly and in doing so 
turned metaphysics into an empirical science. I have also 
given the correct Thomistic response to the question, a re­
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sponse which (based on the distinction of the objects and 
methods of the various sciences) solves the problem while 
preservingthe integrity, necessity and value of metaphysical 
knowledge. 
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NOTBS 
1. IIln short, on the issue of the possibility of the synthetic 
a priori, there just is not any way of avoiding a choice as 
between Aquinas and Kant. One either has to fish ... with 
Aquinas, or be content to cut bait with Kant" (Veatch 253). 
2. Maurer defines terminus as where the intellect finds 
II in the data grasped by the faculty in question the evidence 
on which it bases the truth of its judgement".(p.74,n.1) 
